Thesis title: Relational Epistmic Injustice: An Animal Approach to Knowing
My PhD project aims to develop a theory of relational injustice, a dual ethical/epistemic concept that falls under the category of epistemic injustice. I seek to do this through an examination of the power dynamics between humans and animals, working through the relational spaces of knowing, and of care. Situated at the intersection of ethics and epistemology, my project examines questions such as:
What are the ethics of knowing animals?
What moral and epistemic dysfunctions occur when the motivations for knowing are human-centric (and not altruistic)? if the space within which knowing takes place is framed by real-world and paradigmatic relations of dominance and exploitation?
Can we ever move toward an adequate or accurate understanding of animal experiences if power relations between knower and known are vastly unequal, and the reason for or behind the knowing of animals is fundamentally unethical? Must we, at all times, seek to know?